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deltachat-core/libs/cyrussasl/lib/checkpw.c

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/* SASL server API implementation
* Rob Siemborski
* Tim Martin
* $Id: checkpw.c,v 1.79 2009/05/08 00:43:44 murch Exp $
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1998-2003 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For permission or any other legal
* details, please contact
* Office of Technology Transfer
* Carnegie Mellon University
* 5000 Forbes Avenue
* Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
* (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395
* tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu
*
* 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by Computing Services
* at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)."
*
* CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
* THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
* AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
* AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <config.h>
/* checkpw stuff */
#include <stdio.h>
#include "sasl.h"
#include "saslutil.h"
#include "saslplug.h"
#include "saslint.h"
#include <assert.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef USE_DOORS
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <door.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifndef WIN32
#include <strings.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#else
#include <string.h>
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H
#include <pwd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_PWD_H */
#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H
#include <shadow.h>
#endif /* HAVE_SHADOW_H */
#if defined(HAVE_PWCHECK) || defined(HAVE_SASLAUTHD) || defined(HAVE_AUTHDAEMON)
# include <errno.h>
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/socket.h>
# include <sys/un.h>
# ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
# endif
#endif
/* we store the following secret to check plaintext passwords:
*
* <salt> \0 <secret>
*
* where <secret> = MD5(<salt>, "sasldb", <pass>)
*/
static int _sasl_make_plain_secret(const char *salt,
const char *passwd, size_t passlen,
sasl_secret_t **secret)
{
MD5_CTX ctx;
unsigned sec_len = 16 + 1 + 16; /* salt + "\0" + hash */
*secret = (sasl_secret_t *) sasl_ALLOC(sizeof(sasl_secret_t) +
sec_len * sizeof(char));
if (*secret == NULL) {
return SASL_NOMEM;
}
_sasl_MD5Init(&ctx);
_sasl_MD5Update(&ctx, salt, 16);
_sasl_MD5Update(&ctx, "sasldb", 6);
_sasl_MD5Update(&ctx, passwd, (unsigned int) passlen);
memcpy((*secret)->data, salt, 16);
(*secret)->data[16] = '\0';
_sasl_MD5Final((*secret)->data + 17, &ctx);
(*secret)->len = sec_len;
return SASL_OK;
}
/* verify user password using auxprop plugins
*/
static int auxprop_verify_password(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userstr,
const char *passwd,
const char *service __attribute__((unused)),
const char *user_realm __attribute__((unused)))
{
int ret = SASL_FAIL;
int result = SASL_OK;
sasl_server_conn_t *sconn = (sasl_server_conn_t *)conn;
const char *password_request[] = { SASL_AUX_PASSWORD,
"*cmusaslsecretPLAIN",
NULL };
struct propval auxprop_values[3];
if (!conn || !userstr)
return SASL_BADPARAM;
/* We need to clear any previous results and re-canonify to
* ensure correctness */
prop_clear (sconn->sparams->propctx, 0);
/* ensure its requested */
result = prop_request(sconn->sparams->propctx, password_request);
if(result != SASL_OK) return result;
result = _sasl_canon_user_lookup (conn,
userstr,
0,
SASL_CU_AUTHID | SASL_CU_AUTHZID,
&(conn->oparams));
if(result != SASL_OK) return result;
result = prop_getnames(sconn->sparams->propctx, password_request,
auxprop_values);
if (result < 0) {
return result;
}
/* Verify that the returned <name>s are correct.
But we defer checking for NULL values till after we verify
that a passwd is specified. */
if (!auxprop_values[0].name && !auxprop_values[1].name) {
return SASL_NOUSER;
}
/* It is possible for us to get useful information out of just
* the lookup, so we won't check that we have a password until now */
if(!passwd) {
ret = SASL_BADPARAM;
goto done;
}
if ((!auxprop_values[0].values || !auxprop_values[0].values[0])
&& (!auxprop_values[1].values || !auxprop_values[1].values[0])) {
return SASL_NOUSER;
}
/* At the point this has been called, the username has been canonified
* and we've done the auxprop lookup. This should be easy. */
if(auxprop_values[0].name
&& auxprop_values[0].values
&& auxprop_values[0].values[0]
&& !strcmp(auxprop_values[0].values[0], passwd)) {
/* We have a plaintext version and it matched! */
return SASL_OK;
} else if(auxprop_values[1].name
&& auxprop_values[1].values
&& auxprop_values[1].values[0]) {
const char *db_secret = auxprop_values[1].values[0];
sasl_secret_t *construct;
ret = _sasl_make_plain_secret(db_secret, passwd,
strlen(passwd),
&construct);
if (ret != SASL_OK) {
goto done;
}
if (!memcmp(db_secret, construct->data, construct->len)) {
/* password verified! */
ret = SASL_OK;
} else {
/* passwords do not match */
ret = SASL_BADAUTH;
}
sasl_FREE(construct);
} else {
/* passwords do not match */
ret = SASL_BADAUTH;
}
/* erase the plaintext password */
sconn->sparams->utils->prop_erase(sconn->sparams->propctx,
password_request[0]);
done:
/* We're not going to erase the property here because other people
* may want it */
return ret;
}
/* Verify user password using auxprop plugins. Allow verification against a hashed password,
* or non-retrievable password. Don't use cmusaslsecretPLAIN attribute.
*
* This function is similar to auxprop_verify_password().
*/
static int auxprop_verify_password_hashed(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userstr,
const char *passwd,
const char *service __attribute__((unused)),
const char *user_realm __attribute__((unused)))
{
int ret = SASL_FAIL;
int result = SASL_OK;
sasl_server_conn_t *sconn = (sasl_server_conn_t *)conn;
const char *password_request[] = { SASL_AUX_PASSWORD,
NULL };
struct propval auxprop_values[2];
unsigned extra_cu_flags = 0;
if (!conn || !userstr)
return SASL_BADPARAM;
/* We need to clear any previous results and re-canonify to
* ensure correctness */
prop_clear(sconn->sparams->propctx, 0);
/* ensure its requested */
result = prop_request(sconn->sparams->propctx, password_request);
if (result != SASL_OK) return result;
/* We need to pass "password" down to the auxprop_lookup */
/* NB: We don't support binary passwords */
if (passwd != NULL) {
prop_set (sconn->sparams->propctx,
SASL_AUX_PASSWORD,
passwd,
-1);
extra_cu_flags = SASL_CU_VERIFY_AGAINST_HASH;
}
result = _sasl_canon_user_lookup (conn,
userstr,
0,
SASL_CU_AUTHID | SASL_CU_AUTHZID | extra_cu_flags,
&(conn->oparams));
if (result != SASL_OK) return result;
result = prop_getnames(sconn->sparams->propctx, password_request,
auxprop_values);
if (result < 0) {
return result;
}
/* Verify that the returned <name>s are correct.
But we defer checking for NULL values till after we verify
that a passwd is specified. */
if (!auxprop_values[0].name && !auxprop_values[1].name) {
return SASL_NOUSER;
}
/* It is possible for us to get useful information out of just
* the lookup, so we won't check that we have a password until now */
if (!passwd) {
ret = SASL_BADPARAM;
goto done;
}
if ((!auxprop_values[0].values || !auxprop_values[0].values[0])) {
return SASL_NOUSER;
}
/* At the point this has been called, the username has been canonified
* and we've done the auxprop lookup. This should be easy. */
/* NB: Note that if auxprop_lookup failed to verify the password,
then the userPassword property value would be NULL */
if (auxprop_values[0].name
&& auxprop_values[0].values
&& auxprop_values[0].values[0]
&& !strcmp(auxprop_values[0].values[0], passwd)) {
/* We have a plaintext version and it matched! */
return SASL_OK;
} else {
/* passwords do not match */
ret = SASL_BADAUTH;
}
done:
/* We're not going to erase the property here because other people
* may want it */
return ret;
}
#ifdef DO_SASL_CHECKAPOP
int _sasl_auxprop_verify_apop(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userstr,
const char *challenge,
const char *response,
const char *user_realm __attribute__((unused)))
{
int ret = SASL_BADAUTH;
char *userid = NULL;
char *realm = NULL;
unsigned char digest[16];
char digeststr[33];
const char *password_request[] = { SASL_AUX_PASSWORD, NULL };
struct propval auxprop_values[2];
sasl_server_conn_t *sconn = (sasl_server_conn_t *)conn;
MD5_CTX ctx;
int i;
if (!conn || !userstr || !challenge || !response)
PARAMERROR(conn)
/* We've done the auxprop lookup already (in our caller) */
/* sadly, APOP has no provision for storing secrets */
ret = prop_getnames(sconn->sparams->propctx, password_request,
auxprop_values);
if(ret < 0) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "could not perform password lookup");
goto done;
}
if(!auxprop_values[0].name ||
!auxprop_values[0].values ||
!auxprop_values[0].values[0]) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "could not find password");
ret = SASL_NOUSER;
goto done;
}
_sasl_MD5Init(&ctx);
_sasl_MD5Update(&ctx, challenge, strlen(challenge));
_sasl_MD5Update(&ctx, auxprop_values[0].values[0],
strlen(auxprop_values[0].values[0]));
_sasl_MD5Final(digest, &ctx);
/* erase the plaintext password */
sconn->sparams->utils->prop_erase(sconn->sparams->propctx,
password_request[0]);
/* convert digest from binary to ASCII hex */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
sprintf(digeststr + (i*2), "%02x", digest[i]);
if (!strncasecmp(digeststr, response, 32)) {
/* password verified! */
ret = SASL_OK;
} else {
/* passwords do not match */
ret = SASL_BADAUTH;
}
done:
if (ret == SASL_BADAUTH) sasl_seterror(conn, SASL_NOLOG,
"login incorrect");
if (userid) sasl_FREE(userid);
if (realm) sasl_FREE(realm);
return ret;
}
#endif /* DO_SASL_CHECKAPOP */
#if defined(HAVE_PWCHECK) || defined(HAVE_SASLAUTHD) || defined(HAVE_AUTHDAEMON)
/*
* Wait for file descriptor to be writable. Return with error if timeout.
*/
static int write_wait(int fd, unsigned delta)
{
fd_set wfds;
fd_set efds;
struct timeval tv;
/*
* Wait for file descriptor fd to be writable. Retry on
* interruptions. Return with error upon timeout.
*/
while (1) {
FD_ZERO(&wfds);
FD_ZERO(&efds);
FD_SET(fd, &wfds);
FD_SET(fd, &efds);
tv.tv_sec = (long) delta;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
switch(select(fd + 1, 0, &wfds, &efds, &tv)) {
case 0:
/* Timeout. */
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
case +1:
if (FD_ISSET(fd, &wfds)) {
/* Success, file descriptor is writable. */
return 0;
}
return -1;
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
default:
/* Error catch-all. */
return -1;
}
}
/* Not reached. */
return -1;
}
/*
* Keep calling the writev() system call with 'fd', 'iov', and 'iovcnt'
* until all the data is written out or an error/timeout occurs.
*/
static int retry_writev(int fd, struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, unsigned delta)
{
int n;
int i;
int written = 0;
static int iov_max =
#ifdef MAXIOV
MAXIOV
#else
#ifdef IOV_MAX
IOV_MAX
#else
8192
#endif
#endif
;
for (;;) {
while (iovcnt && iov[0].iov_len == 0) {
iov++;
iovcnt--;
}
if (!iovcnt) return written;
if (delta > 0) {
if (write_wait(fd, delta))
return -1;
}
n = writev(fd, iov, iovcnt > iov_max ? iov_max : iovcnt);
if (n == -1) {
if (errno == EINVAL && iov_max > 10) {
iov_max /= 2;
continue;
}
if (errno == EINTR) continue;
return -1;
}
written += n;
for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
if ((int) iov[i].iov_len > n) {
iov[i].iov_base = (char *)iov[i].iov_base + n;
iov[i].iov_len -= n;
break;
}
n -= iov[i].iov_len;
iov[i].iov_len = 0;
}
if (i == iovcnt) return written;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PWCHECK
/* pwcheck daemon-authenticated login */
static int pwcheck_verify_password(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userid,
const char *passwd,
const char *service __attribute__((unused)),
const char *user_realm
__attribute__((unused)))
{
int s;
struct sockaddr_un srvaddr;
int r;
struct iovec iov[10];
static char response[1024];
unsigned start, n;
char pwpath[1024];
if (strlen(PWCHECKDIR)+8+1 > sizeof(pwpath)) return SASL_FAIL;
strcpy(pwpath, PWCHECKDIR);
strcat(pwpath, "/pwcheck");
s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s == -1) return errno;
memset((char *)&srvaddr, 0, sizeof(srvaddr));
srvaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(srvaddr.sun_path, pwpath, sizeof(srvaddr.sun_path));
r = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&srvaddr, sizeof(srvaddr));
if (r == -1) {
sasl_seterror(conn,0,"cannot connect to pwcheck server");
return SASL_FAIL;
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)userid;
iov[0].iov_len = strlen(userid)+1;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)passwd;
iov[1].iov_len = strlen(passwd)+1;
retry_writev(s, iov, 2, 0);
start = 0;
while (start < sizeof(response) - 1) {
n = read(s, response+start, sizeof(response) - 1 - start);
if (n < 1) break;
start += n;
}
close(s);
if (start > 1 && !strncmp(response, "OK", 2)) {
return SASL_OK;
}
response[start] = '\0';
sasl_seterror(conn,0,response);
return SASL_BADAUTH;
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SASLAUTHD) || defined(HAVE_AUTHDAEMON)
static int read_wait(int fd, unsigned delta)
{
fd_set rfds;
fd_set efds;
struct timeval tv;
/*
* Wait for file descriptor fd to be readable. Retry on
* interruptions. Return with error upon timeout.
*/
while (1) {
FD_ZERO(&rfds);
FD_ZERO(&efds);
FD_SET(fd, &rfds);
FD_SET(fd, &efds);
tv.tv_sec = (long) delta;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
switch(select(fd + 1, &rfds, 0, &efds, &tv)) {
case 0:
/* Timeout. */
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
case +1:
if (FD_ISSET(fd, &rfds)) {
/* Success, file descriptor is readable. */
return 0;
}
return -1;
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
default:
/* Error catch-all. */
return -1;
}
}
/* Not reached. */
return -1;
}
/*
* Keep calling the read() system call until all the data is read in,
* timeout, EOF, or an error occurs. This function returns the number
* of useful bytes, or -1 if timeout/error.
*/
static int retry_read(int fd, void *buf0, unsigned nbyte, unsigned delta)
{
int nr;
unsigned nleft = nbyte;
char *buf = (char*) buf0;
while (nleft >= 1) {
if (delta > 0) {
if (read_wait(fd, delta))
return -1;
}
nr = read(fd, buf, nleft);
if (nr < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
return -1;
} else if (nr == 0) {
break;
}
buf += nr;
nleft -= nr;
}
return nbyte - nleft;
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SASLAUTHD
/* saslauthd-authenticated login */
static int saslauthd_verify_password(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userid,
const char *passwd,
const char *service,
const char *user_realm)
{
char response[1024];
char query[8192];
char *query_end = query;
int s;
struct sockaddr_un srvaddr;
sasl_getopt_t *getopt;
void *context;
char pwpath[sizeof(srvaddr.sun_path)];
const char *p = NULL;
char *freeme = NULL;
#ifdef USE_DOORS
door_arg_t arg;
#endif
/* check to see if the user configured a rundir */
if (_sasl_getcallback(conn, SASL_CB_GETOPT, &getopt, &context) == SASL_OK) {
getopt(context, NULL, "saslauthd_path", &p, NULL);
}
if (p) {
strncpy(pwpath, p, sizeof(pwpath));
} else {
if (strlen(PATH_SASLAUTHD_RUNDIR) + 4 + 1 > sizeof(pwpath))
return SASL_FAIL;
strcpy(pwpath, PATH_SASLAUTHD_RUNDIR);
strcat(pwpath, "/mux");
}
/* Split out username/realm if necessary */
if(strrchr(userid,'@') != NULL) {
char *rtmp;
if(_sasl_strdup(userid, &freeme, NULL) != SASL_OK)
goto fail;
userid = freeme;
rtmp = strrchr(userid,'@');
*rtmp = '\0';
user_realm = rtmp + 1;
}
/*
* build request of the form:
*
* count authid count password count service count realm
*/
{
unsigned short max_len, req_len, u_len, p_len, s_len, r_len;
max_len = (unsigned short) sizeof(query);
/* prevent buffer overflow */
if ((strlen(userid) > USHRT_MAX) ||
(strlen(passwd) > USHRT_MAX) ||
(strlen(service) > USHRT_MAX) ||
(user_realm && (strlen(user_realm) > USHRT_MAX))) {
goto toobig;
}
u_len = (strlen(userid));
p_len = (strlen(passwd));
s_len = (strlen(service));
r_len = ((user_realm ? strlen(user_realm) : 0));
/* prevent buffer overflow */
req_len = 30;
if (max_len - req_len < u_len) goto toobig;
req_len += u_len;
if (max_len - req_len < p_len) goto toobig;
req_len += p_len;
if (max_len - req_len < s_len) goto toobig;
req_len += s_len;
if (max_len - req_len < r_len) goto toobig;
u_len = htons(u_len);
p_len = htons(p_len);
s_len = htons(s_len);
r_len = htons(r_len);
memcpy(query_end, &u_len, sizeof(unsigned short));
query_end += sizeof(unsigned short);
while (*userid) *query_end++ = *userid++;
memcpy(query_end, &p_len, sizeof(unsigned short));
query_end += sizeof(unsigned short);
while (*passwd) *query_end++ = *passwd++;
memcpy(query_end, &s_len, sizeof(unsigned short));
query_end += sizeof(unsigned short);
while (*service) *query_end++ = *service++;
memcpy(query_end, &r_len, sizeof(unsigned short));
query_end += sizeof(unsigned short);
if (user_realm) while (*user_realm) *query_end++ = *user_realm++;
}
#ifdef USE_DOORS
s = open(pwpath, O_RDONLY);
if (s < 0) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot open door to saslauthd server: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
arg.data_ptr = query;
arg.data_size = query_end - query;
arg.desc_ptr = NULL;
arg.desc_num = 0;
arg.rbuf = response;
arg.rsize = sizeof(response);
if (door_call(s, &arg) < 0) {
/* Parameters are undefined */
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "door call to saslauthd server failed: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
if (arg.data_ptr != response || arg.data_size >= sizeof(response)) {
/* oh damn, we got back a really long response */
munmap(arg.rbuf, arg.rsize);
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "saslauthd sent an overly long response");
goto fail;
}
response[arg.data_size] = '\0';
close(s);
#else
/* unix sockets */
s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s == -1) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot create socket for saslauthd: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
memset((char *)&srvaddr, 0, sizeof(srvaddr));
srvaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(srvaddr.sun_path, pwpath, sizeof(srvaddr.sun_path));
{
int r = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) &srvaddr, sizeof(srvaddr));
if (r == -1) {
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot connect to saslauthd server: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
}
{
struct iovec iov[8];
iov[0].iov_len = query_end - query;
iov[0].iov_base = query;
if (retry_writev(s, iov, 1, 0) == -1) {
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "write failed");
goto fail;
}
}
{
unsigned short count = 0;
/*
* read response of the form:
*
* count result
*/
if (retry_read(s, &count, sizeof(count), 0) < (int) sizeof(count)) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "size read failed");
goto fail;
}
count = ntohs(count);
if (count < 2) { /* MUST have at least "OK" or "NO" */
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "bad response from saslauthd");
goto fail;
}
count = (int)sizeof(response) <= count ? sizeof(response) - 1 : count;
if (retry_read(s, response, count, 0) < count) {
close(s);
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "read failed");
goto fail;
}
response[count] = '\0';
}
close(s);
#endif /* USE_DOORS */
if(freeme) free(freeme);
if (!strncmp(response, "OK", 2)) {
return SASL_OK;
}
sasl_seterror(conn, SASL_NOLOG, "authentication failed");
return SASL_BADAUTH;
toobig:
/* request just too damn big */
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "saslauthd request too large");
fail:
if (freeme) free(freeme);
return SASL_FAIL;
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_AUTHDAEMON
/*
* Preliminary support for Courier's authdaemond.
*/
#define AUTHDAEMON_IO_TIMEOUT 30
static int authdaemon_blocking(int fd, int block)
{
int f, r;
/* Get the fd's blocking bit. */
f = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
if (f == -1)
return -1;
/* Adjust the bitmap accordingly. */
#ifndef O_NONBLOCK
#define NB_BITMASK FNDELAY
#else
#define NB_BITMASK O_NONBLOCK
#endif
if (block)
f &= ~NB_BITMASK;
else
f |= NB_BITMASK;
#undef NB_BITMASK
/* Adjust the fd's blocking bit. */
r = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, f);
if (r)
return -1;
/* Success. */
return 0;
}
static int authdaemon_connect(sasl_conn_t *conn, const char *path)
{
int r, s = -1;
struct sockaddr_un srvaddr;
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(srvaddr.sun_path)) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "unix socket path too large", errno);
goto fail;
}
s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s == -1) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot create socket for connection to Courier authdaemond: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
memset((char *)&srvaddr, 0, sizeof(srvaddr));
srvaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(srvaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(srvaddr.sun_path) - 1);
/* Use nonblocking unix socket connect(2). */
if (authdaemon_blocking(s, 0)) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot set nonblocking bit: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
r = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) &srvaddr, sizeof(srvaddr));
if (r == -1) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot connect to Courier authdaemond: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
if (authdaemon_blocking(s, 1)) {
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "cannot clear nonblocking bit: %m", errno);
goto fail;
}
return s;
fail:
if (s >= 0)
close(s);
return -1;
}
static char *authdaemon_build_query(const char *service,
const char *authtype,
const char *user,
const char *passwd)
{
int sz;
int l = strlen(service)
+ 1
+ strlen(authtype)
+ 1
+ strlen(user)
+ 1
+ strlen(passwd)
+ 1;
char *buf, n[5];
if (snprintf(n, sizeof(n), "%d", l) >= (int)sizeof(n))
return NULL;
sz = strlen(n) + l + 20;
if (!(buf = sasl_ALLOC(sz)))
return NULL;
snprintf(buf,
sz,
"AUTH %s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n\n",
n,
service,
authtype,
user,
passwd);
return buf;
}
static int authdaemon_read(int fd, void *buf0, unsigned sz)
{
int nr;
char *buf = (char*) buf0;
if (sz <= 1)
return -1;
if ((nr = retry_read(fd, buf0, sz - 1, AUTHDAEMON_IO_TIMEOUT)) < 0)
return -1;
/* We need a null-terminated buffer. */
buf[nr] = 0;
/* Check for overflow condition. */
return nr + 1 < (int)sz ? 0 : -1;
}
static int authdaemon_write(int fd, void *buf0, unsigned sz)
{
int nw;
struct iovec io;
io.iov_len = sz;
io.iov_base = buf0;
nw = retry_writev(fd, &io, 1, AUTHDAEMON_IO_TIMEOUT);
return nw == (int)sz ? 0 : -1;
}
static int authdaemon_talk(sasl_conn_t *conn, int sock, char *authreq)
{
char *str;
char buf[8192];
if (authdaemon_write(sock, authreq, strlen(authreq)))
goto _err_out;
if (authdaemon_read(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))
goto _err_out;
for (str = buf; *str; ) {
char *sub;
for (sub = str; *str; ++str) {
if (*str == '\n') {
*str++ = 0;
break;
}
}
if (strcmp(sub, ".") == 0) {
/* success */
return SASL_OK;
}
if (strcmp(sub, "FAIL") == 0) {
/* passwords do not match */
sasl_seterror(conn, SASL_NOLOG, "authentication failed");
return SASL_BADAUTH;
}
}
_err_out:
/* catchall: authentication error */
sasl_seterror(conn, 0, "could not verify password");
return SASL_FAIL;
}
static int authdaemon_verify_password(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userid,
const char *passwd,
const char *service,
const char *user_realm __attribute__((unused)))
{
const char *p = NULL;
sasl_getopt_t *getopt;
void *context;
int result = SASL_FAIL;
char *query = NULL;
int sock = -1;
/* check to see if the user configured a rundir */
if (_sasl_getcallback(conn, SASL_CB_GETOPT, &getopt, &context) == SASL_OK) {
getopt(context, NULL, "authdaemond_path", &p, NULL);
}
if (!p) {
/*
* XXX should we peek at Courier's build-time config ?
*/
p = PATH_AUTHDAEMON_SOCKET;
}
if ((sock = authdaemon_connect(conn, p)) < 0)
goto out;
if (!(query = authdaemon_build_query(service, "login", userid, passwd)))
goto out;
result = authdaemon_talk(conn, sock, query);
out:
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock), sock = -1;
if (query)
sasl_FREE(query), query = 0;
return result;
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ALWAYSTRUE
static int always_true(sasl_conn_t *conn,
const char *userstr,
const char *passwd __attribute__((unused)),
const char *service __attribute__((unused)),
const char *user_realm __attribute__((unused)))
{
_sasl_log(conn, SASL_LOG_WARN, "AlwaysTrue Password Verifier Verified: %s",
userstr);
return SASL_OK;
}
#endif
struct sasl_verify_password_s _sasl_verify_password[] = {
{ "auxprop", &auxprop_verify_password },
{ "auxprop-hashed", &auxprop_verify_password_hashed },
#ifdef HAVE_PWCHECK
{ "pwcheck", &pwcheck_verify_password },
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SASLAUTHD
{ "saslauthd", &saslauthd_verify_password },
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_AUTHDAEMON
{ "authdaemond", &authdaemon_verify_password },
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ALWAYSTRUE
{ "alwaystrue", &always_true },
#endif
{ NULL, NULL }
};
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